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NoTEs
"Bright Line," "Substantial
Participation," or Something Else:
Who is a Primary Violator
Under Rule 1Ob-5?
BY RODNEY D. CHRISMAN °

INTRODUCTION

nor to the Supreme Court's landmark decision m CentralBank
of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA.,'
secondary actors2 were frequently held liable for violations of

J.D. expected 2001, Umversity of Kentucky. The author wishes to thank
Professor Rutheford B Campbell, Jr. for his suggestions and advice and Jason
Coltharp for Ins editorial help. He would also like to thank his family for their
unwavering love and support, and, most of all, his beautiful wife and daughters for
adding the wonder and joy that make life worthwhile.
1 Cent. Bank
ofDenver, N.A. v. First InterstateBank ofDenver, NA., 511 U.S.
164 (1994).
2 Generally
speaking, the issuer of a security is termed the "primary actor."
Although the term "secondary actor" can include parties such as officers, directors,
and indenture trustees (among others), the term is more commonly used to refer to
parties such as lawyers, accountants, underwriters, and investment bankers. For
purposes of this Note, the term "secondary actors" encompasses all ofthese parties.
These so-called "secondary actors" have traditionally been held liable under
various theories of secondary liability, characterized by Professor Danel Fischel
as "judicially inplied civil liability wich has been imposed on defendants who
have not themselves been held to have violated the express prohibition of the
securities statute at issue, but who have some relationship with the primary
wrongdoer." Daniel R. Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the
SecuritiesAct of 1934, 69 CAL. L. REV. 80, 80 n.4 (1981).
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section 10(b) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("section 10(b)') 3 and4
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rule lob-5 ("rule 1Ob-5")
on a theory of aiding and abetting primary violators.' In CentralBank of
Denver, the Supreme Court ended this practice by holding that, based on
the statutory language of section 10(b), there is no private aiding and
abetting cause of action under rule lOb-5. 6 With no private aiding and
abetting cause of action, the Court reasoned that secondary actors can only
be liable for a violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 if they meet the
requirements of a primary violation.'
Before this decision, the question whether a secondary actor was a
prnmary violator or merely an aider and abettor was "largely acadennc," s
because every federal circuit recognized the aiding and abetting cause of
action." Accordingly, the courts had not developed a clear standard for
determining when a secondary actor's conduct rose to the level of a
primary violation. After CentralBankofDenver,however, the lower courts
and commentators have struggled to define the point at winch a secondary
actor's conduct becomes a primary violation."°
3 15 U.S.C.
4 17 C.F.R.

§ 78j(b) (1994).
§ 240.10b-5 (2000).
s See, e.g., Akin v. Q-L Inv., Inc., 959 F.2d 521,526 (5th Cir. 1992); Camp v.
Dema, 948 F.2d 455,459 (8th Cir. 1991); Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d
1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1991); Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819, 820 (2d Cir. 1990); Alan
R. Bromberg & Lewis D. Lowenfels, Aiding and Abetting Securities Fraud:A
CriticalExamination,52ALB.L.REV 637 (1988); William H. Kuehnle, Secondary
Liability Under the FederalSecurities Laws-Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Pnrncples and the Statutory
Scheme, 14 J.CORP. L. 313, 321-22 (1989).
6
Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 191.
7

Id.

I In re MTC Elecs. Tech. S'holders Litig., 898 F Supp. 974, 985 (E.D.N.Y.
1995), vacatedrnpart on reconsiderationby, 993 F Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y 1997).
9 Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 192 (Stevens, ., dissenting).
10 See Robert S. De Leon, The Fault Lines Between Primary Liability and
Aiding andAbettingClaims UnderRule lOb-5, 22 . CORP. L. 723,729-33 (1997);
Robert A. Prentice, Locating that "Indistinct"and "Virtually Nonexistent" Line
Between Primary and Secondary Liability UnderSection 10(b), 75 N.C. L. REV
691, 723-26 (1997); see, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175
(2d Cir. 1998), cert.denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Dannenberg v. PaineWebber
Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. See. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir.
1994); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F Supp. 26, 28 (D.
Mass. 1994); Vosgencluanv. Commodorelnt'l, 862 F. Supp. 1371,1378 (E.D. Pa.
1994); In re ZZZZ Best See. Litig., 864 F Supp. 960, 966 (C.D. Cal. 1994); cf
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This Note analyzes the competing theones currently used by courts and
commentators to determine when a secondary actor's conduct nses to the
level of a primary violation and proposes a workable and logical standard
that can be used to differentiate a primary violation from mere aiding and
abetting. Part I of the Note discusses the decision in Central Bank of
Denver and the resulting dilemma that faced the lower courts in
determining when a secondary actor is a primary violator.' Part II provides
an analytical discussion of the emergence of two tests often used to
determine whether a secondary actor is a primary violator: the "bright line"
and "substantial participation" tests.'2 Finally, Part HI discusses the
elements of a primary violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 as they
relate to a secondary actor and proposes a workable and logical test to
determine when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a prinary
violation.' 3
I. CENTRAL BANK OFDENVER AND ITS WAKE
Central Bank of Denver was an indenture trustee' for a bond issue by
the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public Building Authority ("Authority").' 5 The bonds required that certain land held subject to their liens be
worth at least 160% of the total outstanding principal and interest on the
bonds. 6 AmWest Development was required to issue a written annual
report to Central Bank of Denver evaluating whether the 160% test was
being met.' 7 FollowingAmWest's 1988 appraisal, Central Bank ofDenver
learned that there was a substantial possibility that the test was not being

Fischel, supra note 2, at 82 (interpreting pre-1981 Supreme Court decisions as
indicating "that the theory of secondary liability is no longer viable').
"See mnfra notes 14-31 and accompanying text.
'2 See infranotes 32-112 and accompanying text.
13See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text.
'4 An indenture trustee can be thought of as a "third party administrator" ofthe
debt contract (the "indenture"). 3 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.1, at 144 (3d ed. 1995). The indenture sets out the
rights and duties of all the parties involved, including the duties of the indenture
trustee, winch is usually a bank that acts as the agent for the individual public bond
holders and whose duties often include monitoring the terms of the indenture.
" Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511
U.S. 164, 167 (1994).
16Id.
17 Id.
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met, but, on the encouragement of AmWest, waited to perform an
independent review of the land value appraisals.18 Before that independent
review was ever performed, however, the Authority defaulted on the
bonds.' 9 The plaintiff bond purchasers sued Central Bank of Denver,
AmWest, the Authority, and others, but the case before the Supreme Court
involved primarily whether Central Bank of Denver could be held liable as
an aider and abettor. 0
In determinng whether a private cause of action existed for aiding and
abetting under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, the Supreme Court focused on
the language of the statute. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of
any means or instrmentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of
any facility of any national securities exchange(b) To use or employ, m connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance m contravention of such rules and regulations as the
[SEC] may prescribe. 2'
By its text, section 10(b) is not self-executing, but instead depends upon
"such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe" to carry it into
action. In accordance with this authority, the SEC promulgatedrule lOb-5,
which provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
m the light of the circumstances under wich they were made, not
misleading, or
It
Id at 167-68.
19Id.at 168.
2 Id.
2115

22Id.

U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
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(c) To engage m any act, practice, or course of business whnch

operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 23
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, began ns analysis by stating that
"[w]ith respect
to .the scope of the conduct prohibited by § 10(b),
the text of the statute controls our decision." 24 He went on to hold:
In § 10(b), Congress prolibited mampulative or deceptive acts in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. It envisioned that the
SEC would enforce the statutory prohibition through adminstrative and
injunctive actions. Of course, a private plaintiff now may bring suit
against violators of § 10(b). But the private plaintiffmay not bring a
lOb-5 suit againsta defendantfor acts notprohibitedby the text of§
10(b).
. We have refused to allow lOb-5 challenges to conduct not
prohibited by the text of the statute. 5
Following this logic, the Court reasoned that because the text of section
10(b) does not reach aiding and abetting, there is no aiding and abetting
cause of action under section 10(b).26 Consequently, there could be no
aiding and abetting cause of action under rule lOb-5 because the rule could
not exceed the authority of the statute.27
Although unnecessary to the resolution of the case, the Court
proceeded to the next step in a section 10(b) analysis, which is to "attempt
to infer 'how the 1934 Congress would have addressed the issue had the
lOb-5 [cause of] action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act.' "2 Under this analysis, the Court compared the implied cause of
action under rule lOb-5 with the express causes of action in the 1934 Act.
Based on this comparison, the Court concluded:
From the fact that Congress did not attach private aiding and abetting
liability to any of the express causes of action m the securities Acts, we
2117 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (2000).

Cent. Bank ofDenver,511 U.S. at 173.
1 Id. (emphasis added).
' Id. at 177 ("It is mconsistent with settled methodology in § 10(b) cases to
extend liability beyond the scope of conduct prohibited by the statutory text").
27Id. at 173.
' Id. at 178 (quoting Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau,
508 U.S. 286, 294 (1993)).
24
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can infer that Congress likely would not have attached aiding and abetting
liability to § 10(b) had it provided a private § 10(b) cause of action.29
Even though the Supreme Court unambiguously eliminated the private
cause of action for section 10(b) aiding and abetting violations, the Court
did not let secondary actors off the hook altogether. The Court reasoned:
Because the text of § 10(b) does not prohibit aiding and abetting, we
hold that a private plaintiff may not maintain an aiding and abetting suit
under § 10(b). The absence of § 10(b) aiding and abetting liability does
not mean that secondary actors m the securities markets are always free
from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a
lawyer, accountant, orbank, who employs a manipulative device ormakes
a materialmisstatement (oromission) on which a purchaser or seller of
securities relies maybe liable as aprimaryviolatorunder lOb-5, assuming
all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule lOb-5 are met. In
any complex securities fraud, moreover, there are likely to be multiple
violators; in this case, for example, respondents named four defendants as
30
primary violators.

Thus, while the Court provided a definitive answer that there is no aiding
and abetting cause of action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, its opinion
raised another question that has perhaps proved more perplexing for the
lower courts: when does a secondary actor's conduct rise to the level of a
primary violation?3 1
II. THE EMERGENCE OF TWO TESTS TO DETERMINE WHEN A
SECONDARY ACTOR'S CONDUCT RISES TO THE LEvEL OF A
PRIMARY VIOLATION OF SECTION 10(B) AND RULE
1OB-5 AFTER CENTRAL BANK OFDENVER
Following the CentralBank of Denver decision, commentators and
lower courts have struggled to delineate the point at which a secondary
29

Id. at 179.
1Id. at 191 (citations omitted) (first emphasis added).
31 That tls question has proved more perplexing than aiding and abetting liabi3

lity is illustrated by the relative difficulties that courts have encountered in
answering the two questions. Prior to CentralBankofDenver,every federal circuit
had concluded that an aiding and abetting cause of action existed under section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 192 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Conversely, the federal
circuits have had a much more difficult time agreeing when a secondary actor's
conduct rises to the level of a primary violation. See infra notes 32-112 and
accompanying text.
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actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary violation. Courts and
commentators addressing this issue have most commonly applied33one of
two tests: 32 the "bright line" or the "substantial participation" test.
A.

The "BrightLine" Test

Many courts have interpreted CentralBank ofDenver to mean that, to
be a primary violator under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the secondary
actor must actually make the material nusstatement or omission.3 This
35
view reflects the "bright line" test.
In re Kendall Square Research CorporationSecurities Litigation36
provides an example of the use ofthe "bright line" test. In KendallSquare,
plaintiffs brought suit against several defendants, alleging "losses as a
result of materially misleading statements of revenues from the sale of
[Kendall Square Research Corporation's] high performance parallel
computer systems." 3 All of the defendants settled except for Price
Waterhouse, one of the "big five" accounting firms, and the company's
auditor.3 The complaint alleged that Price Waterhouse violated section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 by (1) reviewing and approving maccurate financial
39
reports for the company, (2) issuing an unqualified audit opinion on the
32

See, e.g., Wright v Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999); Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re
Software Toolworks Inc. See. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re
Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F Supp. 26, 28 (D. Mass. 1994);
Vosgerichlan v. Commodore Int'l, 862 F Supp. 1371, 1378 (E.D. Pa. 1994); In re
777 Best Sec. Litig., 864 F Supp. 960, 966 (CD. Cal. 1994); De Leon, supra
note3310, at 729-33; Prentice, supranote 10, at 725.
Courts and commentators have not used the same nomenclature. This Note's
use of "bright line" and "substantial participation" was inspired by the Second
Circuit's discussion in Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
34 See id., Kendall Square, 868 F Supp. at 28; Vosgenchian, 862 F Supp. at
1378.
35 See Wright, 152 F.3d at 175.
3
1Kendall Square, 868 F Supp. at 26.
37
Id. at 27
38
39

Id.

An unqualified audit opimon is a type of audit opinion that states that the
company's financial statements comply with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") and that the audit was performed in accordance with
Generally Accepted Auditing Standards ("GAAS") with no significant scope
limitations on the audit. It is also known as a "clean" audit opinion. 0. RAY
WHITTINGTON & KURT PANY, PRINCIPLES OF AUDITING 678-79 (12th ed. 1998).
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company's financial statements, and (3) reviewing and approving
misleading representations made m the company's prospectuses for stock
offerings.
The United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts
refused to dismiss the claim that Price Waterhouse could be held liable as
a primary violator of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for its unqualified audit
opinion on financial statements containing material nisstatements of
revenues.4 Although the court failed to fully explain why it refused to
dismiss the claim,42 it seems logical that if Price Waterhouse's statements
in its unqualified audit opinion suggesting that Kendall Square's financial
statements were prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP") turned out to be false, then Price
Waterhouse could be held liable as a primary violator, provided the other
elements of a primary violation were present.
On the other hand, the court found Price Waterhouse immune from
liability for reviewing and approving the company's quarterly financial
reports and proipectuses for stock offerings, and consequently dismissed
that clam. 4 3 In so holding, the court statedThe Supreme Court's decision m CentralBank makes clear that the
policy undergirding it is to constrict the ambit of private actions under
Section 10(b) and to thereby reduce the number of parties implicated by
that statute. Only primary violators, i.e., those who make a material
misstatement or omission or commit a man pulative act, aresubject to
privatesuit underSection I O(b).
The Court rules that the [complaint's] allegations that Price
Waterhouse reviewed and approved the quarterly financial statements and
the Prospectuses do not constitute the malng of a material misstatement;
at most, the conduct constitutes aiding and abetting and is thus not
cognizable under Section 10(b). Because Price Waterhouse did not
actually engage in the reporting of the financial statements and
Prospectuses, butmerely reviewed and approved them, the statements are
not attributable to Price Waterhouse and thus Price Waterhouse cannot be
found liable for making a material misstatement.4
Relying on the Supreme Court's holding in CentralBank ofDenver that
section 10(b) "prohibits only the making of a material misstatement (or
40 KendallSquare, 868 F. Supp. at 26-28.
411d.

42 See id.
43 1d. at

28.
' Id. (citations omitted) (first emphasis added).
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omission),"4 s the court concluded that, m order to be liable as a primary
violator, the defendant must actually make a material misstatement or
omission. 6 The court concluded that Price Waterhouse did not make the
misstatements contained in the financial statements and prospectuses
because those documents, and the nsstatements contained therein, were
not "attributable" to Price Waterhouse4 Accordingly, the court held that
the plaintiffs' claims based on the financial statements and prospectuses
could not go forward."
In Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP,4 9 the plaintiffs brought suit against
Ernst & Young, another of the "big five" accounting firms, for an alleged
primary violation of section 10(b). The violation alleged was that Ernst &
Young had given "private approval of the information contained in a press
release '" that was issued "with a notation that the information [was]
unaudited and without mention of [the company's] outside auditor."5 1 The
Second Circuit began by reviewing the approaches taken by several courts
since the Supreme Court's decision m Central Bank of Denver 5 After
concluding that CentralBank ofDenver mandates the use of the "bright
line" test," the court stated:
We therefore agree with the district court that holding Ernst & Young
primarily liable under the Act "in spite of its clearly tangential role m the
alleged fraud would effectively revive aiding and abetting liability under
a different name, and would therefore run afoul of the Supreme Court's
holding m CentralBank."54
Like the district court in Kendall Square, the Second Circuit held that a
secondary actor must actually make the material misstatement or omission
Is Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511
U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
' Kendall Square,868 F Supp. at 28.
47

Id.

48 Id.

49Wrightv.

Emst&YoungLLP, 152F.3d 169 (2dCir. 1998), cert.denied, 525
U.S. 1104 (1999).
50Id.
at 171.
511d.
Seezd. at 174-75.
3 The court so concluded because it reasoned that CentralBank ofDenverrequires that the defendant actually make the misstatement or onmssion to be held
liable under section 10(b) and rule lob-5. The court determined that, of the two
tests, only the "bright line" test actually imposed such a requirement. See id.
"Id. at 175 (quoting Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, No. 97 CIV. 2189(SAS),
1997 WL 563782,at *3 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 10, 1997)).
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m order for its conduct to rise to the level of a primary violation. In
addition, the court concluded that "the misrepresentation must be attributed
to that specific actor at the time ofpublic dissemination" ' before that actor
could be liable as a primary violator.
While attempting to answer what it means to make a misstatement or
omission, the court left unanswered another question: how does one
determine whether the misrepresentation has been "attributed" to the
secondary actor 9 To say that the misstatement or omission must be
"attributed" to the secondary actor provides no more guidance than to
simply reiterate that the secondary actor must actually make the
misstatement or omission in order to be held liable. Again, like Kendall
Square,the court seems to have intuitively determined which statements
were actually made by the defendants without articulating a test by which
it arrived at its determination.
Other courts have applied the "bright line" test. In In re MTC
ElectronicsTechnologiesShareholdersLitigation,;6 for example, plaintiff
shareholders brought suit inthe United States District Court for the Eastern
District of New York, alleging that MTC had made false
misrepresentations.57 Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the company
falsely stated in press statements and SEC filings that the company had
secured agreements to provide cellularphone service andrelated equipment
to customers in China. 8 When it was revealed that no such agreements
existed, MTC Electromcs' stoekpnce plummeted,59 and those shareholders
injured by the price drop sued various company officers, the underwriters
for the company's stock offerings (H.J. Meyers), and the company's
accounting firm (DBO Dunwoody). 6°
The plaintiffs alleged that H.S Meyers was a primary violator of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for participating in the drafting and
dissemination of the company's November 1991 prospectus for its public
offering, and for disseminating a research report on the company that
contained allegedly false statements made by H.J Meyers. 6' The court held

55 Id.

5 Inre MTC Elecs. Tech. S'holders Litig., 898 F Supp. 974 (E.D.N.Y. 1995),

vacatedin parton reconsiderationby, 993 F Supp. 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1997).
17 Id.at 977
5s1d. at 977-78 (noting that the price
of the stock went from $5per share to $30
per share after the public statements).
91Id.
at 978.
60
61

Id.

See Id. at 978, 987
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that a suit could not be maintained against H.J. Meyers for having
participated in the drafting and dissemination of the prospectus, but that a
suit could be maintained against HJ. Meyers for its allegedly false
statements made m a research report that it had dissemmated. 62 Again, like
the courts inKendall Square and Wright, the MTC Electronics court
determined that the secondary actor must actually make the misstatement
or omission to be held liable. The court did not, however, articulate a
standardby which other courts and secondary actors could determine when
such a statement has been made by the secondary actor.
Similarly, the court held that a suit could be maintained against DBO
Dunwoody based on its issuance of an unqualified audit opion.6 Like the
court inKendall Square,6 the court inMTC Electronics concluded that
because an auditor actually makes statements in its audit opinion, the
auditor can be held liable as a primary violator if those statements turn out
65
to be false or misleading.
In analyzing the various claims against these parties and the confusion
ofthe lower courts regarding what constitutes a primary violation, the court
made the following statement, which has been used by courts" and
commentators67 to articulate the "bright line" test and the reasoning behind
it:
[]f CentralBankis to have any meaning, a defendant must actually make
a false or misleading statement m order to be held liable under Section
10(b). Anything short of such conduct is merely aiding and abetting, and
no matter how substantial that aid may be, it is not enough to trigger
liabilityunder Section IO(b). 61
Still, like Kendall Square and Wright,6 9 the MTC Electronics court
correctly asserted that the nsstatement or omission must be made by the
secondary actor, but failed to articulate how one determines whetherthe
secondary actor made the misstatement or omission. In so doing, the court
illustrated the conceptual strength and weakness of the "bright line" test.
62 Id. at987
63 Id.

at 988.
1 See supranotes 41-42 and accompanying text.
65MTCEecs., 898 F Supp. at 988.
6See, e.g., Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
67See, e.g., Prentice, supra
note 10, at 725.
MTCElecs., 898 F Supp. at 987 (emphasis added).
69 See supranotes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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In summary, the "bright line" test is not really a test at all. Instead, it
is more of a statement: In order to be a primary violator of rule IOb-5, the
secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or omission in
question. While that statement is correct, it provides no additional guidance
to the investment community beyond what the Supreme Court provided m
CentralBankofDenver.Accordingly, a standard is needed for determining
when a secondary actor has actually made the misstatement or omission
and should therefore be subject to liability under rule lOb-5.
Further, while the "bnght-line" test usually arrives at the right answer,
it does not provide an analytical framework that can be applied to other
cases to determine whether a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level
of a primary violation of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. For example, in
MTC Electronics,the court stated that "a defendant must actually make a
false or misleading statement m order to be [a primary violator]." 0 Further,
in KendallSquare,the court held that "[o]nly primary violators, i.e., those
who make a material misstatement or omission .. are subject to private
suit under Section 10(b)." 71 These cases answer the first question by
concluding that CentralBank ofDenverand the language of section 10(b)
require that a secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or
omission in order to be held primarily liable. Nonetheless, they leave
unanswered how one determines whether the secondary actor "made" the
statement. Part Il ofthis Note proposes a standard by which this question
may be answered. 2
B. The "SubstantialParticipation"Test
Following CentralBank ofDenver, a number of courts have held that,
in order to be a primary violator under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, the
secondary actor need not actually make the material misstatement or
omission (as in the "bright line" test), but may be held liable for
participating m the fraud in some "substantial" way.' This has come to be
known as the "substantial participation" test. 74
70

MTCElecs., 898 F Supp. at 987

In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26, 28 (D.
Mass. 1994).
7 See infra notes 113-36 and accompanying text
71

See Dannenberg v. PameWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. Sec.

Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best Sec. Litig., 864 F
Supp. 960, 971 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
74 Wright v. Ernst &Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998).
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A famous case applying the "substantial participation" test is In re
ZBest SecuritiesLitigation,75 which resulted from the bankruptcy of
ZZZZ Best Co., Inc., once the nation's largest carpet cleaning company.
The company's founder and largest shareholder had engaged in a scam to
pass the company off as being extremely successful and was "ultimately
convicted and unprisoned for fraud and embezzlement."76 The plaintiffs in
the case sued, among many others, the company's auditor, Ernst & Young.
They alleged that Ernst & Young had violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5
by issuing a review reportF on certain interim financial information
released by the company and by its involvement in the creation, review,
and issuance of some thirteen other public statements released by the
company and others.'8 These suspect statements did not contain any
79
indication that Ernst & Young was involved in their issuance.
Ernst & Young conceded that it made the review report and that it
could be liable as a primary violator provided the other elements were met;
however, Ernst & Young argued that it did not make the other thirteen
statements, and thus these statements could not lead to a primary
violation.8" The United States District Court for the Central District of
California began its analysis by noting that "in CentralBank,the Supreme
Court's opinionmakes clear that more than sunplyknowmg assistance with
the underlying fraudulent scheme is required for Section 10(b) liability."81
However, relying on pre-CentralBank of Denver authority, the court
disagreedwith Ernst & Young's position 2 andheld that "anyone intricately
involved in [the] creation [of public statements such as those at issue].
should be held liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5." 83
Dannenberg v. PaineWebberInc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.
84 is anothercasewherethe
SecuritiesLitigation)
"substantial participation"
75

Z

Best, 864 F. Supp. at 960.
963.
'A review report is a report issued on some type of financial information when
less than an audit has been performed. A review reportprovides less assurance than
does an audit and accompanying opimon. See WHITTINGTON & PANY, supranote
39, at 719-24.
78 ZZZZ Best, 864 F Supp. at 964.
79 Id at 965, 968.
0Id.
81Id.
at 969.
2Ernst & Young argued for an application of the "bright line" test. See id. at
968.
1aId. at 970.
8 Dannenbergv. PameWebber
Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc. See. Litig.),
50 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 1994).
761Id.at
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test was used. Dannenberginvolved disappointed investors who brought
suit against Deloitte & Touche (another "big-five" accounting firm),
underwriters, and others for alleged violations of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 after the company's stock lost substantially all its value.8s The
complaint allegedthat the accountants were primary violators because they
had reviewed a duplicitous letter to the SEC, had consulted the company
about the letter, and had drafted and edited another such letter.86 Though
both letters were issued by the company and not by Deloitte & Touche, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that "[t]bis evidence is sufficient to sustain a
primary cause of action under section 10(b) and, as a result, CentralBank
87
does not absolve Deloitte.
Several other cases have also concluded that substantial participation
m a primary violation constitutes a primary violation. In Cashman v.
Coopers & Lybrand,88 the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois held that Coopers & Lybrand could be liable under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for"play[ing] a central role m the drafting and
formation of the alleged misstatements." 89 Further, in Phillips v. Kidder,
Peabody& Co.,90the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that the underwriter could be liable for "actively
participat[ing] m formulating the language of the prospectus. . even
though the Prospectus was published in the name of the issuer." 9'
The "substantial participation" test can fairly be stated as follows: a
secondary actor who substantially participates in the production of
documents or other materials that contain misstatements or omissions may
be held liable as a primary violator of rule lOb-5. This characterization of
rule lOb-5 liability is at great variance with the "bright line" test and with
the Supreme Court's opinion in CentralBank ofDenver
First, as to the differences between the "bright line" test and the
"substantial participation" test, a comparison of ZZZZ Best and Kendall
Square is instructive. The facts of ZZZZ Best are very similar to the facts
of Kendall Square.'2 In both cases, the companies' auditors were accused
85 See
86 See

id. at 620.
id. at 627-29.
87
Id. at 628 n.3.
" Cashman v Coopers & Lybrand, 877 F Supp. 425 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
89 1d. at 432.
oPhillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 933 F. Supp. 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), af'd,
108 F.3d 1370 (2d Cir. 1997).
911Id. at 316.
92 Comparesupra notes 37-40 and accompanying text with supra notes 75-79
and accompanying text.
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of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 violations based upon their issuance of
audit or review reports and their participation m various other public
statements that were not attributed to them m any way.93 In both Kendall

Square and ZZZZ Best, it was agreed that the reports released by the
auditors could be the basis of a prinary violation cause of action, provided
that the other elements were met." Thus, the "bright line" and the
"substantial participation" tests are m agreement insofar as these types of
statements can amount to a primary violation.
The rift between the two tests arises m the context of the auditors'
participation m other public statements that were in no way attributed to
them. Using the "bright line" test, the court m Kendall Square found that
after CentralBank of Denver a secondary actor must actually make the
misstatement or omission m order to be held liable as a primary violator. 95
Conversely, the court m ZZZZBest ignored the Supreme Court's mandate
that section 10(b) "prohibits only the makng of a material misstatement (or
onnssion),"9 and concluded that a secondary actor could be held liable as
a primary violator forparticipation inthepreparation ofcompany material,
whether or not they were actually made by the secondary actor.97 This
decision was obviously not based on an analysis of the elements of a
primary violation, but on the court's feelings regarding fairness, which is
demonstrated by the court's statement that Ernst & Young "should be
[held] liable under Section 10(b)/Rule 10b-5." Surely, to arrive at this
conclusion the court contemplated policy considerations. However, as the
Supreme Court stated in CentralBank of Denver, "[t~he issue
is not
whether imposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good
policy but whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute."99

93 See In re Kendall

Square Research Corp. Sec. Litig., 868 F. Supp. 26,27 (D.
Mass. 1994); In re ZZZZ Best See. Litig., 864 F Supp. 960, 964-65 (C.D. Cal.

1994).
9 The court m Kendall Squareheld that tns was the case as part of its ruling,
seeKendallSquare, 868 F. Supp. at 29, while defendant Ernst & Young conceded
m ZZZZBest that it could be liable-if the other elements were met, see ZZZZBest,
864 F. Supp. at 965.
' Kendall Square,868 F. Supp. at 28.
6 Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511
U.S. 164, 177 (1994).
9 See ZZZZBest, 864 F Supp. at 970.
9 Id. (emphasis added). The court concluded that the defendants "should" be
liable (a legislative decision) and then proceeded to find a way to hold them liable
(sunilar to the legislature enacting a statute to remedy a perceived wrong).
9 Cent. Bank ofDenver,511 U.S. at 177
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Accordingly, the ZZZZ Best court exceeded the bounds of the statute and
the Supreme Court's opinion.
Further, the previously discussed cases demonstrate that courts using
the "substantial participation" test ignore the Supreme Court's ruling in
CentralBankofDenverand the language of the statute, thereby "reviv[ing]
aider and abettor liability under a different name."'" This fact is further
illustrated by comparing an aiding and abetting cause of action with the
"substantial participation!' test.
In CentralBank of Denver,the Supreme Court noted that the Tenth
Circuit identified the elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action as
follows: "(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness [or
knowledge] by the alder and abettor as to the existence of the prmnary
violation; and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violatorby the
aider and abettor." ' For purposes ofthis Note, these elements will be used
in comparison to the "substantial participation" test, because they are
representative of the elements used in the other circuits for an aidingoand
abetting cause of action.102 In most cases there will be a primary violation,
for example, by the issuer of the security. Further, recklessness (or
knowledge) on the part ofthe secondary actor still needs to be shown under
both aiding and abetting and primary causes of action. Accordingly, the
distinction between aiding and abetting and the "substantial participation'
test binges on the difference between "substantial assistance" and
"substantial participation."
11 Wright v. Ernst &Young LLP, No. 97 CIV. 2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782,
at *3(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997), aft'd, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998).
101 Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511

U.S. at 168 (citing First Interstate Bank of Den-

ver, NA. v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898-903 (10th Cir. 1992)).
",See,e.g., Levmev. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478,1483 (9th Cir. 1991);
K & S P'ship v. Cont'l Bank, NA., 952 F.2d 971,977 (8th Cir. 1991); Schatz v.
Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485,495 (4th Cir. 1991); Fine v. Am. Solar King Corp., 919
F.2d 290, 300 (5th Cir. 1990); Schlifkle v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 947 (7th
Cir. 1989); Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480 (11th Cir. 1988); Moore
v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303 (6th Cir. 1987); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700
F.2d 774, 777 (lst Cir. 1983); UIT, Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922
(2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consol. Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.
1978). The Federal Circuit for the District of Columbia never directly recognized
aiding and abetting liability, but suggested that it would likely do so m Zoelsch v.
ArthurAndersen& Co., 824 F.2d 27,35-36 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The Seventh Circuit
applied a test different from those used m the other circuits m that it required that
the aider and abettor "commit one of the 'mampulative or deceptive' acts
prohibited under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5." Robin v. Arthur Young &Co., 915
F.2d 1120, 1123 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Clearly, the difference here is more a matter of semantics than legal
substance. As a practical matter, juries and judges will be unable to
distinguishbetween "assistance" and "participation," and secondary actors
once liable as aiders and abettors now become liable as "primary
violators." Surely this result is not what the Supreme Court intended in
strikng down aiding and abetting liability. Thus, the court m Wrightwas
correct in concluding that adherence to the "substantial participation' test
"would effectively revive aiding and abetting liability under a different
name, and would therefore run afoul of the Supreme Court's holding in
CentralBank.111°3
While the "substantial participation" test seems to be aiding and
abetting liability in primary violator's clothing, many courts and
commentators have been more than willing to use this test to hold
secondary actors liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-S' 10 This is
disturbing for two reasons. First, judicial use of the less rigorous
"substantial participation" test after Central Bank of Denver creates
uncertainty for future actors. It is a fundamental principle of the American
legal system that courts are bound to follow the decisions ofa higher court.
Without this rule, courts' decisions cannot be relied upon as standards of
conduct and actors are uncertain which actions can lead to liability and
which cannot. For example, following CentralBankofDenver,a securities
lawyer or an accountant might assume that he or she will only be liable for
misstatements or omissions that he or she actually made and not
misstatements or omissions made by others. However, to this person's
surprise and chagrin, it may become clear that even though the Supreme
Court has held that aiding and abetting liability does not exist, 10 5 a court
may still hold secondary actors liable under an "aiding and abetting"-type
theory. This type ofuncertainty is somethmgthe law should strive to avoid,
as it causes costs to society with no reciprocal benefit. Unfortunately, this
is exactly the situation that has developed following the CentralBank of
Denver decision.
Second, courts have for the most part adopted the "substantial participation" test with very little thought or discussion, l°6 and the corn103 Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.

dented, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999) (quoting Wnghtv. Ernst &Young LLP, No. 97 CIV
2189(SAS), 1997 WL 563782, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997)).
See supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
101 Cent.Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 177
" See, e.g., Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolworks Inc.
Sec. Litig.), 50 F.3d 615, 628 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that "the plaintiffs'
complaint clearly alleges" a primary violation by a secondary actor without
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mentators who argue for an expansive test such as the "substantial
participation" test argue mainly on policy grounds 07 -an argument that the
Supreme Court specifically foreclosed m the Central Bank of Denver
decision. 0 8 The Court explicitly stated that "[t]he issue
is not whether
nposing private civil liability on aiders and abettors is good policy but
whether aiding and abetting is covered by the statute."'"
The important point here is that the proper role of the courts is to
mterpret laws as they are written, and only ifpolicy arguments are helpful
in that context should they be referenced. However, when the language of
the statute is clear on its face, then the courts are duty-bound to interpret
the statute as written, and the legislature is the proper place for those
disappointed with the statute's application to voice theirpolicy arguments.
As Alexander Hamilton appropriately stated in the Federalist Paper No. 78,
"The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
disposedto exercise WILL mstead of TJDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative
body."" 0 Those who advocate that policy justifications dictate that the
courts expandthe implied cause ofactionunder section 10(b) andrule lOb5 through use of the "substantial participation" test essentially argue that
explaining the reasons for the "clarity" or distinguishing between "substantial
participation" and mere "aiding and abetting").
' See, e.g., Prentice, supra note 10, at 727-32.
'o Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 188. In addressing the policy arguments
forwarded by the Commission, the Court stated:

The SEC points to various policy arguments in support of the lOb-5
aiding and abetting causq of action. It argues, for example, that the aiding
and abetting cause of action deters secondary actors from contributing
to fraudulent activities and ensures that defrauded plaintiffs are made
whole.
Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and
structure of the Act, except to the extent that they may help to show that
adherence to the text and structure would lead to a result "so bizarre" that
Congress could not have intended it. That is not the case here.
Extending the lOb-5 cause of action to aiders and abettors no doubt
makes the civil remedy more far reaching, but it does not follow that the
objectives of the statute are better served. Secondary liability for mders and
abettors exacts costs that may disserve the goals of fair dealing and
efficiency in the securities markets.
Id. (citations omitted).
'19 Id. at 177
" 0THE FDERALISTNO. 78, at 230 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P Fairfield ed.,
2d ed. 1966).
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the courts should "substitut[e].. their pleasure to that of the legislative
body ""
This result cannot be tolerated m a government that relies on the
separation of powers, wich envisions different governmental bodies with
distinct roles. Unlike the legislature, the courts have neither the resources
nor the time to thoroughly examine these policy arguments and thereby
arrive at an informed decision. The current security statutes represent the
legislature's position on these issues, and, while it is desirable that security
fraud be pumshed, the Supreme Court has rightly concluded, based on the
text of the statute, that "not every instance of financial unfairness
constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10(b)."11 2

M.

IN THE WAKE OF CENTRAL BANK OFDENVER,
WHO IS A PRIMARY VIOLATOR?

Because the Supreme Court's decision m Central Bank of Denver
requires that a secondary actor be a primary violator to be held liable under
a section 10(b) andrule lOb-5 cause of action,11 it is necessaryto evaluate
what constitutes a primary violation in the typical sense. While there are
varying formulations of what constitutes a primary violation of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5, generally there are two broad categories under which
a primary violation can occur: misstatements and oMissions.1 4 Although
the elements vary slightly depending on the category of the violation, Isthe
I1I
IM.

"2 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980).
See supraParts I and H.
S
114 Rule lOb-5 also forbids the use of "device[s], scheme[s], or artifice[s] to
defraud," and prohibits "engag[ing] m any act, practice, or course ofbusmess" that
defrauds. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2000). The Supreme Court has seemingly
categorized anything that is not a misstatement or an onussion as a manipulation,
which has been defined as a term of art that covers wash sales, matched orders, and
the like. Prentice, supranote 10, at 699 n.30 (citing Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430
U.S. 462, 472-74 (1977); and Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199
(1976)). Consequently, courts and commentators focus on nusstatements and
omissions as the two main categories of primary violations by secondary actors.
See, e.g., Wrightv. Ernst & Young, 152 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 1998), cert.denied,525
U.S. 1104 (1999); In re Kendall Square Research Corp. Se. Litig., 868 F Supp.
26 (D. Mass. 1994); Prentice, supra note 10, at 699. Likewise, this Note focuses
only on misstatements and omissions m determining who is a primary violator.
11 ,See generallyRutheford B Campbell, Jr., Elements
ofRecovery UnderRule
10b-5: Scienter, Reliance, and Plaintiff's Reasonable Conduct Requirement, 26
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following elements are common to both categories: (1) a misstatement or
omission made by the defendant," 6 (2) that is material," 7 (3) made in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities' (4) with a degree of
scienter," 9 (5) that is actually relied upon,2 0 (6) and justifiably relied
upon, 121 (7) and that causes'22 (8) damages." Further, in the case of an
omission, the defendant must also have had a duty to disclose the nonpublic information and must have in some way made a fraudulent use of
the information, such as through trading or tippmg. 24 For the purposes of
determining when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a*
primary violation, it is not necessary to discuss every element of a primary
S.C. L. REv 653 (1975).
116 Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2000); see 2 HAZEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.2.1, at 468.
"7 Basic, Inc. v. Levmson, 485 U.S. 224,231-32 (1988); Stransky, 51 F.3d at
1331; 2 HAZEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 466-67; see, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968); Listv. Fashion Park, Inc., 340
F.2d 457, 460-61 (2d Cir. 1965).
118 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); Stransy, 51 F.3d at 1331; 17 C.F.R § 240.10b5(c) (2000); 2 HAZEN, supranote 14, § 13.2. 1, at 465-66; see Blue Chips Stamps
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
"9 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680,695 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hocbfelder, 425
U.S. 185, 193 (1976); Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAZEN, supranote 14, § 13.2,
at 460, § 13.2.1, at 467, § 13.4; see Campbell, supra note 115, at 655-64, 685-89.
See generally James D. Cox, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. A Critique and
Evaluation of Its Impact upon the Scheme of the Federal Securities Laws, 28
HASTINGS L. 569 (1977).
2' Basic, 485

U.S. at 243; Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAZEN, supranote 14,

§ 13.2.1, at 468; see 2 id. § 13.5B; Campbell, supra note 115, at 674-83, 692-93,
701; see, e.g., List, 340 F.2d at 457
121 Kennedy v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987); see 2
HAZEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 468, § 13.5B, at 531-34, § 13.12; Campbell,
supra note 115, at 664-69, 689-91, 700; see, e.g., Teamsters Local 282 Pension
Fund v. Angelos, 762 F.2d 522, 529-30 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing Zobnst v. Coal-X,
Inc., 2708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983)).
Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAZEN, supra note 14, § 13.2.1, at 468; see 2
id. § 13.6; see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154
(1972); Bastian v. Petren Res. Co., 892 F.2d 680, 685-86 (7th Cir. 1990).
23
1 Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1331; 2 HAZEN, supranote 14, § 13.2.1, at 466,468; see
2 id. § 13.7
14 See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997); Dirks v SEC,
463 U.S. 646,653-55,661-64 (1983); Chiarellav. United States, 445 U.S. 222,230

(1980); 2 HAZEN, supra note 14, § 13.9-.10.
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violation m detail because many of the elements will apply identically to

primary and secondary actors alike. Accordingly, tis Note discusses only
those elements relevant to determiningwhethera secondary actor's conduct
rises to the level of a primary violation: (1) misstatement or omission; (2)
scienter; and (3) reliance.
A. DefiningMisstatement or Omission
The CentralBankofDenverdecision mandates that the secondary actor
actually make the misstatement or omission to be liable as a primary
violator under section 10(b) andrule lOb-5. 115 Because the secondary actor
must actually make the misstatement or omission, it is most likely that the
Court m CentralBank ofDenverintended the use of the "bright line" test
over the use of the "substantial participation" test." Thus, the question left
to be answered is how one determines when a secondary actor has actually
made the misstatement or omission. Tls Note proposes that the test to
determine whether a secondary actor actually made the misstatement or
omission should be whether a reasonable investor would conclude that the
secondary actor made the misstatement or omission m question.
For many reasons, this standard provides a workable and logical guide
for judges, juries, and secondary actors in determining whether a
misstatement or omission has been "made" for the purposes of classifymg
the secondary actor as a primary violator under section 10(b) and rule lOb5. First, this standard should not cause judges, juries, or secondary actors
trouble or confusion m its application because they are already accustomed
to applying this type of reasonable investor standard with respect to other
elements of recovery m an action under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. For
example, the Supreme Court has announced a reasonable investor standard
m the context of judging materiality, holding that a misstatement or
omission is material if there is "a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder [or investor] would consider it important." 127 Accordingly,
there is no reason to conclude that the reasonable investor standard
proposed herein would be unacceptably confusing when a similar standard
has been successfully applied to gauge the materiality of a statement or
omission.
" Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 26164, 177 (1994).
1 See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
12

7TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,449 (1976) (assessing the

standard in the rule 14a-9 context); accordBasic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224,
231-32 (1988) (assessing the standard in the rule 10b-5 context).
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Further, the standard proposed herein is consistent with the Supreme
Court's decision in CentralBank ofDenver and the language of section
10(b), because the secondary actor must actually make the misstatement or
omission in order to be a primary violator. Unlike the "substantial
participation" test, the proposed "reasonable investor" standard does not
revive aiding and abetting liability under a different name. Instead, it
addresses some of the fairness concerns underlying the "substantial
participation" test, albeit within the textual limitations of the statute.
Specifically, holding a secondary actor liable only when both (1) all ofthe
elements of a rule lOb-5 action have been satisfied, and (2) a reasonable
investor would conclude that such misstatement or omission was made by
the secondary actor is fair to plaintiffs and within the bounds of section
10(b). If a reasonable investor would not conclude that the secondary actor
actually made the misstatement or omission, one might still argue that m
fairness the secondary actor should be held liable. The statute, however,
dictates that the secondary actor not be held liable. As such, the standard
proposed herein maintains the proper role of thejudiciary as interpreters of
legislative enactments.
Though a standard similar to the proposed "reasonable investor"
standard is already implicit under the "bright line" test, to eliminate any
doubt it is necessary that the Supreme Court take up another case on this
issue and directly and unequivocally state the proper standard. Until then,
a secondary actor's liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 will be a
function of the circuit in which the secondary actor commits the alleged
violation.
B. Central Bank of Denver's Implicationfor the ScienterRequirement
Scienter is discussed here not because it is helpful in determining
whether a secondary actor's conduct nses to the level of a primary
violation, but because CentralBank ofDenver has important implications
for secondary actors regarding the scienter requirement. The Supreme
Court's elimination ofaider and abettor liability in CentralBankofDenver
demonstrates its desire to limit liability under section 10(b) andrule 10b-5.
The statutory language does not include recklessness, nor does fraud
typically include recklessness. Yet the Court has twice specificallyreserved
the question whether recklessness can constitute scienter.12 8 If the Court
follows its recent pattern of strict construction of section 10(b) and rule
See Aaron v SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686 n.5 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v
Hockfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976).
2
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lOb-5 as in CentralBank of Denver, it will likely rule that recklessness
does not constitute scienter.
If the Court were to so hold, this ruling would have a profound impact
on secondary actor liability, because secondary actors almostnever act with
the intent to defraud. Truly, "it is highly unlikely that an accounting firm's
certification of inaccurate financial statements resulting from an inadequate
audit is attributable to a desire to defraud investors."'29 Accordingly, the
ambit of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 liability for secondary actors may be
receptive to another shock wave like the one resulting from CentralBank
ofDenver
C. Why the Reliance RequirementShould be Left Alone
In CentralBank ofDenver, the Supreme Court stated that "[w]ere we
to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the defendant
could be liable without any showing [of reliance]." 3 0 This statement
illustrates that the Supreme Court believes that reliance is vital to causes
of action for primary violations of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5.
Accordingly, commentators and courts have looked to reliance as the
crucial element for determining when a secondary actor's conduct could
violate section 10(b) and rule lOb-5.13 '
Reliance is a very complicated element of recovery in actions under
rule lOb-5. 3 2 This has led to many complicated analyses based on various
ideas of reliance, such as fraud-on-the-market, efficient versus nonefficient markets, and the inference of reliance from other elements such
as materiality 13 However, these analyses ignore the question that must be
central to any section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 claim against a secondary
actor-namely, did the secondary actor actually make the misstatement or
omission in question? Consequently, the already overburdened reliance
'2 Fischel, supra note 2, at 108 n.152.
30 Cent. Bank of Denver, NA. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 511
U.S. 164, 180 (1994). The Court's statement makes perfect sense. If the defendant
has not made a misstatement or omission, there is nothing upon which a plaintiff

can rely.
31
See, e.g., Prentice,supranote 10, at 737 (citingAmxterv. Home-StakeProd.
Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225 (10th Cir. 1996)); Lisa Klein Wager & John E. Failla,
Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA-The
Beginning of an End, or Will Less Lead to More?, 49 Bus. LAw 1451, 1461
(1994).
13 1 See 2 HAZEN, supranote 14, § 13.5B.
1 See id.
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element 3' should not be given the additional task (which is one that it
cannot complete satisfactorily) of determining when a secondary actor's
conduct rises to the level of a primary violation of section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5.
Further, altering the analysis under reliance is unnecessary if it is
determined that the secondary actor made the statement under the test
herein proposed. If the secondary actor made the statement, then the
reliance analysis can be conducted as it would m any other section 10(b)
andrule lOb-5 case. Ifnot, areliance analysis isunnecessary forthe section
10(b) and rule lOb-5 clauns against the secondary actor because, as the
Supreme Court stated in CentralBank of Denver, section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 "prohibit[ ] only the making of a material misstatement (or
onlission)." 35
Finally, a statement made in ZZZZ Best illustrates the type of flawed
analysis that can result if the courts look to "reliance" as the test to
determine when a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a primary
violation. The court stated that "[w]hile the investing public may not be
able to reasonably attribute the additional misstatements and omissions to
[the secondary actor], the securities market still relied on those public
statements and anyone intricately involved in their creation and the
resulting deception should be liable under Section 10(b)/Rule l0b-5."'136
This statement highlights how the Supreme Court's mandate that the
secondary actor actually make the misstatement or omission can easily get
lost in the shuffle of an analysis based on reliance'.
CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's decision in Central Bank of Denver
unequivocally abolished aider and abettor liability under section 10(b) and
rule 1Ob-5, but lower courts and commentators have been unable to agree
upon the point at which a secondary actor's conduct rises to the level of a
primary violation. Courts and commentators have proposed and advanced
two rival tests: the "bright line" test andthe "substantial participation" test.
The "bright line" test is more faithful to the language of section 10(b) and
CentralBanklof Denver, and thus must be preferred to the "substantial
The complexity of the reliance element and its mconsistent application make
this element ill-suited to answer the additional question whether the secondary
actor actually made the misstatement or omission m question.
13 Cent. Bank ofDenver, 511 U.S. at 177
6
13
Inre ZZZZ Best See. Litig., 864 F Supp. 960, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1994).
'
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participation" test, which is little more than aiding and abetting liability
under a different name. However, for ease of application and to provide a
proper analytical framework, the "bright line" test should be modified to
definitively state that a secondary actor's conduct nses to the level of a
prmaryviolation ifareasonable investorwould construe themisstatement
or omission to be made by the secondary actor, and ifall the other elements
for recovery are met. Such a test would adhere to the statutory language of
section 10(b) and provide a logical test by which secondary actors could
guide their conduct, while also promoting fairness to investors.

